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Industrial Policy In A Federal Structure: State Industrial Policy
In the United States
Joel Rogers*
B efore considering state industrial policy efforts directly, let me say
something about the scope and limits of the national initiatives that
currently frame them. I abstract initially from fiscal concerns - ie.,
whether there is any money to do that which is proposed - and only
look at content.
THE CLINTONIAN VIEW OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY
The "new Democrats" of the Clinton administration came to
power on the promise of delivering an economic policy different from
the "tax and spend and regulate" policies alleged of old-style Demo-
crats. Whether they can deliver on that promise in a way that preserves
discernible differences between Democratic and Republican economic
policy is anyone's guess. The purported distinction from past policies on
which this promise rests goes something like this.
Under "old" Democratic views, direct government regulation of
prices and other conditions of market entry, the use of government
purchasing power to subsidize favored economic practices, the redistri-
bution of income on the basis of need rather than contribution, and
other efforts to alter the terms and conditions of economic reward were
acceptable means of "promoting the general welfare." The "new"
Democratic view holds that such policies are generally pointless, self-
defeating, or malign. They generate excessive bureaucracies, inappro-
priately substitute government judgment for market judgment, are in-
sufficiently attentive to labor supply effects, or otherwise presume
greater government capacity to shape the economy than is warranted.
Of the many reasons offered for this change of view, the most ba-
sic concerns a fundamental change in the structure of the U.S. econ-
omy itself. A generation ago, the story goes, the U.S. operated as an
essentially closed domestic system. In that context, effective govern-
ment control of the domestic economy was indeed possible. Now, how-
ever, the U.S. operates in a truly international economic system, char-
acterized by the relatively free flow of capital and goods across national
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borders. In this world, government can no longer directly determine -
afortiori not with the command-and-control regulation and macro-eco-
nomic policy tools available from old - the character of production
within its borders, largely because the very notion of economic "bor-
ders" is meaningless.
This view, it is emphasized, does not amount to a prescription for
laissez faire. The Clintonians, like the Dukakisites before them, believe
that government has an important role to play in securing "good jobs at
good wages." That role, however, is both diminished and changed by
the new environment. Instead of vainly trying to constrain capital's
choices in economic development, government should use its power to
improve the factors of production at capital's disposal. It should invest
in physical infrastructure, diffuse technology, and improve the coun-
try's human capital base. This, it is hoped, will make it an attractive
site for investment by firms offering good jobs - in particular, those
roving multinationals that locate their best jobs in rich nations even as
they source much production to poor ones. And that, it is thought, is
about as much as it is reasonable to hope for.
Completing this story is a certain description of the current char-
acter of economic activity within the U.S. itself. On this description,
unrelenting pressures (again, heavily, international ones) are forcing a
restructuring of U.S. firms away from Taylorist'production and toward
"high performance" forms of work organization engaged in "quality
competition." As used in contemporary debates, "high performance"
organization roughly denotes the most complete and flexible deploy-
ment of firm resources to advance continuous innovation. "Quality
competition" denotes a market strategy emphasizing non-price product
or service features - variety, customization, performance, timeliness in
delivery, attendant servicing of customers - as well as cost. Under a
regime of quality competition, products and services are essentially all
viewed as capital goods. Customers assess their price/performance ra-
tio, rather than price alone.
In a world economy densely populated by countries and firms pay-
ing a fraction of U.S. wages, such a quality strategy is essential to pre-
serving living standards. After all, unless customers are getting a qual-
ity premium, they will not be willing to absorb "premium" labor costs.
.But, again, according to the Clintonian view, firms are already moving
in the high-performance direction - and, it is assumed, paying labor a
premium as they do so. There exists a happy congruence between what
firms find they need to do to be profitable and what the society needs to
secure the general welfare.
Government's role in facilitating the high performance transition
at home is equivalent to what is recommended for making the U.S. an
internationally attractive investment site - education, technology dif-
fusion, modernized infrastructure. High performance work organization
[Vol. 19:175 1993
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- characterized by flexible automation, on-line quality control, multi-
skilled work groups, flattened management hierarchies, increased cross-
department communication, greater autonomy for front-line production
workers in all manner of decisions - requires workers with high and
broad skills, which recommends greater efforts in education and train-
ing. To meet demand for high-performance supplier chains, govern-
ment should help diffuse technology be diffused to those small and me-
dium-sized enterprises ("foundation firms") currently frozen out of
capital markets. And to satisfy demand for modern logistics, it needs to
revamp its rotting infrastructure.
WHAT IS WRONG WITH THIS PICTURE?
What are we to make of all this as a description of the world, and
of appropriate policy? What I make of it is that it is seriously wrong-
headed. To be sure, international competition is real, and the tasks of
social management of the economy have importantly changed. To be
sure, something like "quality competition" is necessary to defending
living standards in the United States. And, to be sure, industrial re-
structuring of the right sort will require better education, more technol-
ogy diffusion, and the repair and modernization of our infrastructure.
But the way in which any of these tasks will need to be discharged, the
degree to which firms will need to be pressured to accomplish them,
and whether their accomplishment alone exhausts the list of needed or
possible interventions depends on one's analysis of the options available
to government, and the actual facts of current restructuring in the
United States. And on both these fronts I think the Clintonians are
mistaken.
For starters, the picture of a more or less complete international-
ization of the U.S. economy is overdrawn. To believe the Clintonians,
the economy is now one in which all factors move freely across borders,
except those sunk in the ground or attached directly to human beings;
the institutional infrastructure of production (labor market institutions,
producer associations, community ties of various stripes and kinds) is
largely irrelevant to the quality of production; and government has no
hard ground on which to stand in imposing any social control over the
economy. The real economy, however, is one in which most goods and
services are still not directly exposed to international competition; it is
one in which quality competition is critically contingent on immobile
institutional supports (providing training and integrated social services,
facilitating firm innovation and learning, enabling and encouraging
producers to live up to international quality standards, attaching to this
support a variety of antecedent conditions on its receipt); and it is one
in which government purchasing power alone provides a powerful
weapon to shape the path of development. This reality suggests that the
room for maneuver and guidance is far greater than the Clintonians
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would have us believe. Government need not be entirely timid.
And the government had better not be timid, since the path of
current economic restructuring in the U.S. is not nearly as happy as
the Clintonians like to think. Most U.S. firms are not responding to
competitive pressures by going the "high-wage, high-performance"
route, but by either "sweating" labor under conditions of very low in-
vestment in training and new technology, or by advancing a species of
"lean commodity production" that uses advanced quality and produc-
tion cost-cutting tactics, but does not share the resulting productivity
gains with labor. This pattern of response is what explains the last
twenty years of data on wage decline, wage depression among the fast-
est growing segments of the economy, and the weak or negative rela-
tion, on a firm and sectoral basis, between productivity growth ,and
wages. Far from a happy congruence between what is needed for profit-
ability and what is needed for general welfare, "good" firms are losing
out to "bad" firms pursuing tactics which, if generalized, will be (al-
ready have been) disastrous for living standards.
What the U.S. needs most to do in this context is foreclose the
low-wage option on restructuring. With a stick of direct labor market
and production regulation, and a carrot of government purchases and
assistance awarded those firms moving in the desired direction, it needs
to push restructuring in a direction other than the one it now "natu-
rally" takes. This need not involve government substitution of its judg-
ment for that of firms on how results are best achieved. Nor must it
take the form of "picking winners and losers" by industry group. How-
ever, it will require setting social standards of performance for firms
and using government power to enforce them. Regrettably, this is just
what the administration appears unwilling to do. One consequence of
this unwillingness will be a continuation of present trends toward de-
clining living standards and increased inequality. A more immediate
consequence is that even the administration's narrower agenda of in-
dustry assistance will not enjoy broad business support, and will have
limited effect. That agenda assumes an industry demand for higher
quality factors - in particular, human capital - that in most cases
does not exist. Advancing it risks having all the production and labor
market effects of pushing on a string.
HARD BUDGET CONSTRAINTS, AND HARD LIBERALISM
Finally, hard budget constraints and an exceptionally "liberal" in-
stitutional terrain create barriers to effective government intervention
- even of the narrower kind favored by the Clintonians. To take only
one example, the administration had made clear its interest in devising
a "school to work" transition system in the U.S. heavily modeled on
German apprenticeship. But the amounts of money being talked about
are trivial. To put this in perspective, German apprentices each cost
[Vol. 19:175 1993
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employers about $4,500 a year on average (in some areas of manufac-
turing, the costs is several times this), in what are typically four year
programs of "dual" workplace-school instruction. Were a German ap-
prenticeship system extended to the U.S., with the sixty-five percent
rate of coverage for the total high school cohort claimed in Germany, it
would cost U.S. employers about thirty-two billion dollars annually. No
one seriously believes that anything approaching this effort will be
made in the U.S. anytime soon on behalf of young front-line workers.
Even if the money were available, however, a variety of institu-
tional supports on which the German system relies are not available
here. In addition to high schools delivering young adults with sound
knowledge tested at national standards (something that it would be
possible to do something about, albeit also costly), the German system
relies on several such institutional supports. One is a dense network of
more or less obligatory business association. This assures requisite take-
up rates among business of young apprentices and serves to generalize
standards across firms. A second is a fairly "patient" relationship be-
tween banks and industry. This enables firms to invest in the skills of
the future workhorse even during recession. A third is an incredibly
highly regulated youth labor market. This makes it possible to set
trainee allowances low, which makes training itself affordable to firms.
It requires, however, limiting the availability of non-apprentice employ-
ment. A fourth, indispensable both to the provision and monitoring of
training, is competent and nearly universal worker representation (in
the forms of works councils), and a powerful labor movement able to
regulate training-compensation trade-offs and to push for industrial up-
grading society-wide. Fifth and finally, as that which apprenticeship
both feeds and relies on, is an industrial culture in which firms are
already organized in ways that take advantage of advanced skills. This
is what pulls the string.
None of this is available in the United States. All of it would be
powerfully resisted if anyone tried to build it. And in no case can it be
built overnight. This lends an air of unreality to the bold claims being
made for youth apprenticeship, but not that program alone. There are
similar budget constraints, and similar institutional gaps, in virtually
all the proposed areas of Clintonian intervention. And so I am skeptical
of it going very far. So much, however, for the national scene.
STATE-BASED INDUSTRIAL POLICY
We can back into discussion of state-based industrial policy by
noting four constraints - other than national policy itself - that
frame it. Where appropriate in this comparative discussion, I note the
contrasts with Canadian provinces.
*There are many American states, and the share of U.S. product (or,
generally, even particular industry segment) taken by any one of them
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is not commanding. This limits the leverage any single state govern-
ment has over business practice within their borders, and institutional-
izes pressures for a "Delawarization" of business regulation - inter-
state competition to attract business by freeing it of constraints. Con-
trast this with Canada, which has one fifth the number of sub-national
jurisdictions, and where two provinces - Quebec and Ontario - to-
gether claim a majority share of national product.
-States have limited authority to intervene in many areas that are rele-
vant to industrial upgrading. State regulation of private sector labor
relations, for example, is heavily preempted by federal legislation on
that subject, as is state regulation of private pensions. Again, by con-
trast, Canadian provinces have far more substantial autonomous
powers.
-With the exception of primary and secondary schooling, states appear
in industrial policies in the U.S. chiefly as fiduciary or other agents of
the federal government itself. One consequence is that their program
structure and administration tends to mimic the pathologies of the na-
tional government. So, for example, the federal U.S. training effort
consists of 125 different programs administered by fourteen different
federal departments and agencies, many with roughly identical target
populations and purposes but all with different mandates. By law, this
sprawling effort is largely replicated at the state level, with resulting
inefficiencies. With a weaker federal role, by contrast, Canadian prov-
inces have been able to move more quickly on program reorganization.
-States are lacking in funds. Federal supports to areas of need, in par-
ticular cities, have been deeply cut over the last twenty years. The fis-
cal burden of state responsibility for certain aspects of public health
insurance has ballooned with health care costs themselves. A variety of
new federal mandates on state action, without federal financing, have
added to the strain. And taxes have been very hard to raise. As a re-
sult, state efforts to provide more than essential social services are lim-
ited, and most states are even more reluctant than usual to do anything
that might be construed as limiting business.
Always subject to the first three limitations, and more recently the
last as well, state development efforts in the postwar period have moved
through a series of phases. Each phase is more or less closely identified
with the emergence of a particular strategy of development, though the
pursuit of new strategies has typically not led to outright abandonment
of the old. Today the residue of each is found in most state develop-
ment efforts.
From the immediate postwar period on through the early 1970s,
state policy consisted almost exclusively of boosterism - extolling their
virtues as a site for investment and general business attraction
("smokestack chasing") - as greased by direct grants, tax abatements,
and other easily monetized incentives. A second phase, beginning in the
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late 1970s and continuing through the early 1980s, saw states move
from general business attraction and deal greasing to the targeting and
capitalization of potential "winner" firms - a sort of "development
bank" model. A third phase, and dominant today, is a "modernization
service" model. Here, the state is less concerned with picking nascent
winners than in upgrading what it already has - chiefly through im-
provements in the delivery of training, and through technology diffu-
sion. Finally, and evident only in a few states, we have recently begun
to see what has been described as an "associative" model of develop-
ment. Here, states explicitly seek to develop cooperative institutional
linkages among firms, between labor and business, or between the pri-
vate sector and the state - industry networks, training consortia, and
tripartite labor market boards would be examples, respectively - to
diffuse learning, or achieve needed scale in the delivery or receipt of
training or new technology. The state invests directly in the "institu-
tional infrastructure" (as described above) needed for a well-run
economy.
Again, I do not want to overdraw these distinctions, or suggest
that the most recent strategies are dominant. Although the most vocal
state development offices think of themselves as chiefly in the business
of "modernization," for example, old fashioned subsidies for attraction
and retention still comprise the bulk of development efforts. Michigan,
for example, commonly cited as a leading example of state-based mod-
ernization, spends thirty times more on tax abatements for business
than it does on all its modernization services. This said, let us look at
what states are doing in modernization - in particular, again, in tech-
nology diffusion and training.
Since 1980, about twenty-eight states have established one or an-
other species of technology extension services. Budgets are low - cur-
rently about eighty-three million dollars total annually, or less than
three million dollars a state. Industry support is relatively weak - of
the eighty million dollars, only eight percent is supplied by industry, or
about $240,000 on average per state (roughly, the cost of lunch in New
York). Programs are often university-based, and consist largely of deal-
by-deal tie-ins between university researchers and local business in
solving some particular production problem or commercializing some
new research. At least some programs, however, have a significant field
staff. These meet with owners (often invited in to discuss some narrow
production problem), try to gain their confidence, and offer various ad-
vice on new technologies, business practices, and sources of state sup-
port - very much like -the more familiar agricultural extension
programs.
State technology programs are new, diffuse, and insignificant
enough not to have been subjected to much systematic evaluation. The
general result appears to be that they are considered unobjectionable,
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and in some cases they develop animated support from business clients,
but they are not used widely or deeply (in the sense of leading to full
firm restructuring).
Moving to training, there is a huge amount of action in the states
around educational reform, and at least part of this concerns reform of
post-secondary vocational training. "School to work" transition pro-
grams are widespread, although subject to the constraints noted before.
Perhaps more promising, community colleges and vocational and tech-
nical schools have developed extensive outreach programs to local busi-
ness. These not uncommonly descend into an "offer them any course
they want" mentality that threatens college program integrity, but also
has the happy effect of getting these educational institutions at least
thinking of themselves as an agent of modernization. In my home state
of Wisconsin, for example, much of the manufacturing extension ser-
vice work is done through the vocational and technical college system.
In addition to standard fee-for-service arrangements on course in-
struction, about forty-four states have programs for "customized" labor
training grants funded out of unemployment insurance or general reve-
nue. Taken together, these programs represent about $400 million in
annual expenditures, although variation across states is huge (Califor-
nia alone accounts for more than quarter of that total, while one state
program has little over $100,000 budgeted annually). Such training
grants are generally used to limit job loss or ease the pain of it. They
typically go to firms that are in the process of shutting down or down-
sizing. At least some states, however, have sought to use customized
training grants as a spur to modernization. A few - Maryland is per-
haps most advanced in this - combine non-training-related moderniza-
tion services with customized training funds in integrated packages of
assistance provided to firms "moving in the right direction." Firms sat-
isfying various antecedent conditions of upgrading get significant sup-
port. Those that do not satisfy those conditions do not get the support.
Here, at least, state policies advance on federal policies in choosing to
favor some sorts of firms over others. Moreover, the combination of
grants and services is in many cases a big enough carrot to get firms to
change behaviors.
If training monies and technology assistance/extension are in-
creasingly related in dealings with firms, many states have moved to
consolidate service delivery more generally, across both programs and
the different client bases of individuals and firms. While the goal of
"one stop shopping" for labor market services remains elusive, there
does seem to be significantly better information exchange among pro-
grams than in the recent past. And in some states - here I think Wis-
consin is the leader - there are fledgling efforts to develop regional
labor market boards combining both integrated service delivery and
joint employer efforts on training, standard setting, and advanced tech-
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nology use. I would expect to see many more such efforts in the coming
years. As these sorts of services become more important, people will be
less patient with outmoded political boundaries on their provision, and
more insistent that their delivery, as well as content, be bounded by
real divides in the economy.
Such flexible program integration, functionally tied to regional la-
bor markets and directed toward a certain path of restructuring, is of
course much easier to talk about than achieve, however. While there is
definite learning going on at the state level, there are very few places
one can point to where serious industrial policy efforts are being made.
The vast bulk of traditional state development efforts are not coordi-
nated meaningfully with training. Despite superficial talk of program
integration, separate fiefdoms for boosters, developers, and modernizers
is the norm. Despite the rhetoric of "good jobs at good wages," the
effective goal of economic development administration is still generally
seen as "helping business" - any business. (Here, the repeated injunc-
tions from the reinventing government crowd to "get close to your cus-
tomer" are uninstructive, or worse, when the customer's behavior itself
needs to be changed.) The institutional constraints noted at the outset
remain real. And given the Clintonians view on what industrial policy
should be, the supporting framework of federal action is not present.
By and large, then, these laboratories of democracy remain laboratories
of frustration.
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